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 Mark Schroeder, Being For. 
 Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2008.  xvi +  197pp. 
 
 
Mark Schroeder’s Being For is about expressivist semantics for natural language.  
The sort of expressivism Schroeder is concerned with holds:  
 
(uses of) declarative sentences express mental states;  
 
while some of these states are beliefs, others –in particular, those expressed by 
ascriptions of goodness, badness, and obligation --are conative or emotional states  
focused on objects and acts;  
 
 though these latter states lack propositional content, they stand in inferential 
relations with one another and with states of belief; 
 
sentences inherit their inferential relations from the mental states they 
(conventionally) express.  
 
Schroeder claims that “no expressivist view…offered in the last twenty years…offers an 
actual account of the mental state expressed by any logically complex sentences.”  (8-9). 
Being For works through the details of what Schroeder takes to be the best account of 
such states.  He offers the book not as an answer to those who have criticized 
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expressivism, but as a confirmation of their fears:  his conclusion is that 
“Expressivism….is an extremely unpromising hypothesis about the workings of natural 
languages.”  (179) 
 According to Schroeder, the primary problem with extant expressivist accounts is 
their failure to explain what’s expressed by negations of normative sentences.  Against 
Gibbard, who takes as primitive the notion of disagreeing with a belief, decision, or 
endorsement of a norm1, Schroeder complains that (a) with this primitive, Gibbard ‘is 
essentially helping himself to the very thing that…expressivists need to explain’ (52); (b) 
Gibbard’s notion of disagreement, embedded in the theoretical apparatus of Gibbard 
2003, doesn’t explain the difference between thinking two options to both be permissible 
and equally good (being indifferent) and suspending judgment on whether either of two 
options is acceptable (being undecided).2   
  This reviewer was unconvinced that the expressivist needs to give a much more 
elaborate account of the mental state of disagreement than Gibbard does.  Surely we do 
understand what it is to disagree with someone’s belief (thereby holding that the belief is 
wrong); surely we understand what it is for someone to disagree with a decision (thereby 
thinking that the act decided on is not the thing to do).  Surely we can make sense of the 
idea that disagreeing with a belief or decision is being in a state incompatible with the 
belief or decision.  If this much is clear, Gibbard’s primitive is clear enough to bear 
                                                
1 See in particular Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Harvard University Press, 1990) and 
Thinking How to Live (Harvard University Press, 2003).  Gibbard’s basic idea is that if a 
sentence express a belief, approval, or allegiance to a norm, its negation expresses 
disagreement with the belief, approval, or allegiance.  How Gibbard proposes projecting 
this idea to the negation of molecular sentences is too complicated to take up in a brief 
review. 
2 Here Schroeder echoes Jamie Drier; see ‘Negation for Expressivists’ in Ross Schafer-
Landau, ed., Oxford Studies in Meta-Ethics I (Oxford University Press, 2006) 
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explanatory weight.  As for the difference between being undecided and indifferent, I 
couldn’t help thinking that Gibbard was as entitled as anyone else to make use of the 
notion of suspending judgment, and that the ordinary notion of suspending judgment 
applies just as much to practical decision –to being undecided as to what one may or must 
do –as to theoretical decision –to being undecided as to what one may or must believe. 
 Schroeder’s own account is worked out clearly and in detail.  His leading idea is 
that prima facie it’s easy to give an expressivist account of a language in which all the 
atomic sentences –and therefore, all the sentences, period –express a single non-
propositional attitude of approval.  Let S be a set of sentences with Si in S expressing 
approval of act type Ai.3  Suppose we close S under negation, conjunction, and 
disjunction.  Act types are properties, and so they have negations, disjunctions, and 
conjunctions.  Schroeder suggests that the expressivist might say that if sentences A and 
B express approval, respectively, of P and Q,  ¬A expresses approval of P’s negation, 
AvB expresses approval of P and Q’s disjunction, A&B expresses approval of their 
conjunction.4   One can do the same sort of thing for a language, all of whose atomics 
express beliefs:  If a sentence expresses belief in p, its negation expresses belief in p’s 
negation; if sentences express beliefs in p and q, their conjunction expresses belief in p 
                                                
3 Schroeder’s running example is a language whose atomics are of the form FOR(A),  
where A is a ‘descriptive gerundive phrase’; the idea is that the sentences express 
attitudes like approving of giving money to charity.  I take it that gerundive phrases pick 
out act types.  
4 Schroeder’s account actually employs a primitive notion, being for, which Schroeder 
assumes to be some sort of pro-attitude, but does not assume can be identified with 
whatever attitude our pre-theoretical use of ‘approves’ picks out.  This makes evaluating 
the semantics the book gives a bit tricky, since it’s not altogether clear how sentences like 
those mentioned in the last note are supposed to be related to sentences we understand.  I 
assume that whatever being for is supposed to be, it is enough like approval that we can 
understand things of the form FOR(A) as expressing approval (of some sort) of what is 
associated with A. 
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and q’s conjunction; etc.  This general strategy can be used to give an account of a 
language, some of whose atomics express beliefs and some of whose atomics express 
approval, provided that approval can be analyzed as a kind of belief or belief can be 
analyzed as a kind of approval.  Schroeder suggests that the expressivist should identify 
believing p with approving of proceeding as if p. 
 Unfortunately, there are problems with this approach, ones to which Being For 
devotes considerable ingenuity.   A rather large problem is that when S is logically 
complex, it proves impossible to make the sentence S express the belief that S.  The 
problem in its simplest form is this.  We are told to identify believing p with approving of 
proceeding as if p.  So, using the obvious abbreviation 
 
believing that swimming is healthy = approving of pai swimming is healthy 
 
believing that swimming is not healthy = approving of pai swimming is not 
healthy 
 
But if we think of ‘swimming is healthy’ as expressing approval of pai swimming is 
healthy and apply the principle that if S express approval of F, ¬S expresses approval of 
F’s negation , we must say 
 
 ‘swimming is not healthy’ expresses approving of not pai swimming is healthy. 
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Thus ‘swimming is not healthy’ fails to express the (state the analysis identifies with the) 
belief that swimming is not healthy.  The same problem arises with all the rest of the 
connectives.  It has nothing to do with the idea that belief is proceeding as if; the problem 
arises when believing p is identified with approving of bearing R to p, for any relation R.   
This leads Schroeder to complicate his account of belief, identifying believing p 
with a pair of attitudes:  approving of pai p, approving of not pai not p.  This actually 
doesn’t fix the problem –at the end of the day, after expanding his language to a first 
order one, Schroeder shows that it still isn’t the case that in general a sentence S 
expresses the belief that S.  One can show that each sentence S is associated with a 
mental state closely related to what, on the analysis adopted, is identified with the belief 
that S, if one is willing to make some very strong (and in some cases implausible) 
assumptions. But the assumptions are in some cases so implausible that one can hardly 
take them seriously. 5 
   Call the above Account A; Schroeder investigates an alternative to it.  On the 
alternative, one continues to identify believing p with approving of pai p and approving 
of not pai not p.  But one abandons the goal of showing that each sentence S expresses 
the belief that S.  Instead, one provides an account of  “mistake conditions” for the 
attitudes that Account A assigns to sentences, where an account of mistake conditions for 
a set of attitudes S is a theory that entails, for each attitude α in S, a biconditional of the 
form 
 
                                                
5 For example, one must assume that the claims 
 For all x, I approve of proceeding as if x is F 
 I approve of proceeding as if for all x, x is F 
are necessarily equivalent. 
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It’s a mistake to have α iff p is false.6    
 
It turns out on the account that Schroeder sketches that (for example) if α is the attitude 
expressed by S, α’ that expressed by S’, and  
 
 It’s a mistake to have α iff p is false 
 It’s a mistake to have α’ iff p’ is false, 
 
then:  it’s a mistake to have the attitude expressed by ¬S iff p’s negation is false; it’s a 
mistake to have the attitude expressed by SvS’ iff the disjunction of p and p’ is false; it’s a 
mistake to have the attitude expressed by S&S’ iff the conjunction of p and p’ is false.  
Suppose now that a sentence’s truth conditions are the conditions under which it’s not a 
mistake to have the attitude it expresses.  Then this account of the mistake conditions 
provides the expressivist a way to vindicate the idea that the truth conditions of a (belief 
expressing) sentence S are determined the attitude S expresses. 
To give the account of mistake conditions, however, one must once again make 
strong and often very implausible assumptions about approval, about the properties of the 
relation proceeding as if, and about the conditions under which it is a mistake to approve 
of proceeding as if a claim is true.  The upshot is that the approach to expressivism Being 
For investigates is unable to make it plausible that the semantic properties of sentences 
are determined by the attitudes they express.  It is primarily for this reason –plus the fact 
that there is a rather large collection of constructions (e.g., modals and probability 
                                                
6 Obviously we are ignoring issues having to do with context sensitivity. 
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ascriptions) that the approach apparently can’t handle –that Schroeder draws the gloomy 
conclusion cited at the beginning of this review. 
Is the sort of approach Being For investigates one that a clear headed expressivist 
would consider adopting?  I have doubts.  A minor one is that the analysis of belief is 
wrong –the person who approves of proceeding as if his partner is faithful need not 
believe that his partner is faithful.  More importantly, it is very unclear that (for example) 
if ‘dancing is good’ expresses approval of dancing and ‘singing is good’ expresses 
approval of singing, their disjunction expresses approval of the disjunctive property 
dancing or singing.  It is hard to know how deep this problem is, since Schroeder does 
not make clear what approving of an act type or property is.7  Certainly someone who 
thinks that either dancing or singing is good –which Schroeder’s account identifies with 
approving of the disjunctive type dancing or singing --need not have a positive attitude 
towards every instance of dancing or singing.  So approving of F can’t be identified with 
anything like being disposed to have a favorable attitude towards (what one takes to be) 
F’s instances.  Indeed, to think that singing or dancing is good, one needn’t have a 
positive attitude towards any singing or dancing:  one might think that one activity is 
good, one bad, but have no idea which is which.   
This leads us to what I take to be the major question about Schroeder’s approach.  
Schroeder assumes that the expressivist must think that if two sentences express 
approval, so do their negation, conjunction, and disjunction.  Though he doesn’t say so, 
one suspects that he thinks this because he thinks that the expressivist is committed to the 
view that sentences both atomic and complex express “natural” mental states such as 
                                                
7 Neither is there any account of what it is to be for a property. 
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belief, doubt, approval, disapproval, preference, and the like.  If this is right, and if A and 
B express approval, what other mental state could their disjunction express, save 
approval? 
 If the last quarter century of meta-ethics has taught us anything, it is that if this is 
what the expressivist thinks, the expressivist program in meta-ethics is a bust.  But why 
must the expressivist think this?  The expressivist’s core idea is that certain states of mind 
–in particular, belief, approval, disagreement with belief or approval, and collections of 
beliefs, approvals, and disagreements –stand in more or less transparent inferential 
relations.    He thinks this underwrites the idea that there are other states of mind –not 
themselves to be identified with beliefs, approvals, or disagreements --that reflect these 
relations.   Such states are presumably functional states, ones defined in terms of their 
relations (in particular, in terms of their inferential relations) to belief, approval, 
disagreement, and one another.  The content of these latter states is unpacked in terms of 
such relations.  A stock example:  the expressivist will postulate a state of mind S which 
(a) one is (typically disposed to be) in if one either disbelieves that it will rain or has 
decided to take an umbrella;  (b) is one such that if one is in it and comes to believe that it 
will rain, one is typically disposed to decide to take one’s umbrella; (c) is consistent with 
any combination of  
 
(a) either believing or disbelieving that it will rain, and  
(b) either deciding for or against taking an umbrella  
 
save believing that it will rain and deciding not to take to take an umbrella.   
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Such states, the expressivist tells us, are involved in reasoning about what to do 
and what to think.  They are, he tells us, what are expressed by molecular sentences –e.g., 
S is expressed by ‘if it is going to rain, I shall take an umbrella with me’.  It is these sorts 
of states of mind –and not the simple beliefs, approvals, and so forth expressed by our 
simplest sentences –that the sophisticated expressivist thinks to be associated with 
molecular sentences.   From this perspective, the idea that there are a few, simple states 
of mind which are such that every (declarative) sentence of natural language expresses 
one or another of them is a non-starter.  Of course this view of how mental states (and 
sentences) acquire content is controversial.  But it is surely this sort of story that the 
sophisticated expressivist has in mind.  To show that expressivism is bankrupt, one has to 
show that this sort of story is untenable.  Schroeder’s essay, for all its merits, doesn’t 
engage here.8 
 Being For is a lively, clearly written essay.  It’s required reading for anyone 
interested in the expressivist program in meta-ethics.  It makes a convincing case that a 
particular way of trying to carry out that program won’t work.  What is not clear is why 
we should infer, from the fact that this particular huis is clos,  that all the rest are as well.9 
 
      Mark Richard 
      Harvard University 
 
 
                                                
8 I have sketched an account somewhat like the one gestured at in this paragraph in 
Chapter 3 of When Truth Gives Out (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
9 Thanks to Mark Schroder for comments on an earlier draft. 
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